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Abstract
In ad-hoc networks, autonomous wireless nodes can communicate by forwarding messages for each
other. For routing protocols in this setting, it is known that a malicious node can perform a variety
of attacks just by not behaving according to the speciﬁcation. Whilst secure versions of routing
protocols are under development, little eﬀort has been made to formalise the scenario similarly
to developments in the realm of traditional security protocols for secrecy and authentication. We
present a broadcast process calculus suitable to describe the behaviour of protocols which require a
local memory component for every node. By adding annotations for the origin of messages, we are
able to formalise a vital security property in this context, called store authorisation. Furthermore,
we describe a static analysis for the detection of violations of this property. For a model of the
AODV protocol in our calculus, we are then able to deduce that an attacker may introduce a
routing loop in certain networks.
Keywords: Protocol analysis, language-based security, ad-hoc networks
1 Introduction
Ad-hoc networks are a wireless communication paradigm which allows mobile
nodes to exchange messages without the need for ﬁxed infrastructure or a
centralised control component. Instead, they cooperate with each other by
forwarding data in a multi-hop fashion. Speciﬁcally designed routing protocols
try to determine this behaviour in a resource-eﬃcient way.
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Only recently, with emerging critical applications in the health-care sector,
military communication, and elsewhere, researchers have started to question
the security of these routing protocols by describing attacks and informally
discussing security requirements [5,4]. Taking into account the need for se-
curing routing information relevant for all nodes in the network, it is not
surprising that these requirements turn out to be quite diﬀerent from clas-
sical, “point-to-point” security properties such as secrecy and authentication,
which have been formally investigated in the realm of cryptographic protocols
for a long time. However, attempts to formalise the ﬁndings in the ad-hoc
network setting have not been made as to our knowledge.
In earlier work [6], we have shown a way to model routing behaviour of
ad-hoc networks in a variant of the CBS process calculus [9] and developed a
static analysis for message ﬂow in networks. Here, we build on this work in
order to formalise a security property for ad-hoc networks, mentioned in [4],
which we call store authorisation: storage of routing information concerning
certain nodes should be authorised by these nodes themselves. In order to
do this, we extend our calculus with a tuple store component, private to
every node, and actions for storage and retrieval of tuples. Furthermore, we
introduce annotations to track the origin of broadcast messages. We model the
critical fragment of the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing
protocol [8] and show that a speciﬁcally designed static analysis can record
violations of the store authorisation property in the presence of an attacker.
An interpretation of the analysis results reveals that under certain conditions
a routing loop attack [5] can be performed, which causes packets to traverse
the network in a cycle, thus draining power and bandwidth resources from the
network. For this, our attacker model needs only to be able to eavesdrop on
all communications of the network and to forge routing messages.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present
the variant of CBS we are using to describe routing behaviour in ad-hoc net-
works. It comprises a store-like component for every node and annotations for
the origin of messages. The operational semantics employs the annotations in
order to prevent derivations in networks where nodes try to violate the store
authorisation property.
In Section 3 we review the concept of store authorisation, develop a con-
trol ﬂow analysis which computes a safe approximation for violations of this
property, and present a simple attacker model.
In Section 4 we describe the operation and our model of the AODV pro-
tocol. We apply our analysis to ﬁnd all the property violations the attacker can
perform and discuss the implications of this ﬁnding to the protocol security.
S. Nanz, C. Hankin / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 195–213196
2 The Calculus
In [6] we have presented a variant of the process calculus CBS [9] which enabled
us to model the behaviour of a source routing protocols for ad-hoc networks.
The key idea of the calculus is to express multi-hop message passing by letting
nodes drop messages if they are not within the transmission range of the
broadcasting node. The network topology, which determines this behaviour,
is speciﬁed in a so-called allocation environment α.
Source routing protocols are characterised by the fact that routes are part
of a sent message as lists of node names. Distance vector protocols, which
we want to investigate here, require nodes to locally store the next hop to a
certain destination node. In order to be able to express this behaviour, we
extend our calculus with a store-like component. This might be compared to
the idea of tuple spaces in coordination languages such as Klaim [2], but with
the important diﬀerence that the store is accessible only locally. This seems to
be more suitable in the context of communicating nodes which have to perform
some private computations and store operations in between the transmission
of messages. For security analysis, it enables us to draw a clear distinction
between information available to an eavesdropper of communications and to
an attacker who has captured a node and tries to access the store directly.
2.1 Syntax
The calculus comprises three syntactic categories: terms E, processes P , and
networks N , which are deﬁned in Table 1.
Terms are either variables x ∈ X , names n ∈ N , or locations  ∈ L.
We choose to add locations to the set of terms, whilst they are also used to
distinguish nodes, as we would like to be able to explicitly state the origin
of messages in message components. As usual, we abbreviate lists of terms
with the tilde, e.g. E˜ represents E1, . . . , Ek for some k. We also write |E˜| for
the length of the list E˜, and E˜ = E˜′ denotes |E˜| = |E˜ ′| = k for some k and
Ei = E
′
i for i = 1, . . . , k.
Processes are in polyadic form and incorporate term matching for message
components like in the calculus LySa [3]. Syntactically, this is expressed by
the semicolon: Terms before the semicolon have to equal the ﬁrst components
of a message or tuple, which gives a powerful way to distinguish between
messages and tuples of diﬀerent format.
Furthermore, we add annotations for the origin of terms, written in square
brackets. The intuition behind this is that the initiator of a certain chain of
cause and eﬀect remains visible. Intermediate nodes which just react to a
message reception will copy the origin annotation and take it as annotation
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E ::= x variable, x ∈ X
| n name, n ∈ N
|  location,  ∈ L
P ::= 0 nil
| 〈E˜〉[E] !P send
| (E˜; x˜)[x] ?P receive
| 〈E˜〉[E]E˜ ′ ↓ P store
| (E˜; x˜) ↑ P1 : P2 retrieve
| if E = E ′ then P1 else P2 if
| A deﬁnition
| P1 | P2 parallel composition of processes
N ::= P :,ασ node
| N1 ‖ N2 parallel composition of networks
Table 1
Syntax of the Calculus
for any action caused.
We distinguish the following processes: 0 represents the terminated pro-
cess. The sending (broadcast) of messages is denoted by 〈E˜〉[E] !P , where E˜ is
the message and E is an annotation term evaluating to a location. The action
(E˜; x˜)[x] ?P expresses receiving of messages: E˜ has to match with the ﬁrst
message components, the remaining ones will be bound to x˜; the annotation
term E will be bound to x.
Storage of tuples E˜ is represented by 〈E˜〉[E]E˜ ′ ↓ P , where the initiator
E has to be in the list E˜ ′ of authorised initiators, which evaluates to a list of
locations. One can retrieve tuples from the store by (E˜; x˜) ↑ P1 : P2, where
E˜ has to match with the ﬁrst tuple components, the remaining ones will be
bound to x˜. Depending on whether a matching tuple is found we continue
with P1 or P2.
The if-expression “if E = E′ then P1 else P2” continues with P1 or P2 after
determining term equality of E and E ′. Constants A may represent deﬁnitions
of processes. Processes can also be executed in parallel, written as P1 | P2.
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Networks consist of the parallel composition N1 ‖ N2 of located processes
P :,ασ . The location  is unique for a located process and enables to distinguish
diﬀerent nodes. The allocation environment α : L → [0, 1] provides us with
the connectivity information of a node and thus the network topology: The
likelihood that a message sent by node P ′ :
′,α′
σ′ is received by node P :
,α
σ is
expressed by α′(). σ represents the local tuple store of the node. We may
drop α or σ whenever they are not necessary in a certain context.
2.2 Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of the calculus is deﬁned by means of two transition
relations on networks. The ﬁrst one N1
m
−→p N2 describes the evolution of
a network N1 to a network N2 with probability p during transmission of a
message m. Like in original CBS,  is drawn from a set {!, ?, :}, and the
actions of sending, receiving and losing the message m are denoted by m!,
m?, and m:. Messages are written 〈E˜〉[E]
′,α′, where E˜ is a list of variable-free
terms, E is the annotation term, and  and α represent location and allocation
environment of the immediate sender.
The second relation N1 −→ N2 transforms a network with respect to local,
non-interacting computations only. The two relations are not mutually de-
pendent, however this style of speciﬁcation makes sure that in a derivation all
nodes have completed local computations before the next message exchange.
The rules for the ﬁrst transition relation
m
−→p are given in Table 2. Rule
nil expresses that the nil process 0 :,ασ silently discards any message with
probability 1. Rules send1 and send2 describe the behaviour of 〈E˜〉[E] !P :,ασ .
Such a node silently discards incoming messages with probability 1 as shown in
rule send2. It evolves to P :
,α
σ with probability 1 when broadcasting a message,
speciﬁed in rule send1. Furthermore, the message will carry the annotation E.
There are three rules for the syntactic term for receiving, (E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :,ασ .
rec1 and rec2 describe the semantics if the ﬁrst message components match
with the expectation, i.e. E˜ = E˜ ′1 and |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|, for a incoming message:
In rule rec1, the node chooses to receive the message 〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[E]
′,α′ with
probability α′(), in which case variables of the list x˜ get bound to their
respective components in E˜′2; also, the annotation term E is bound to x.
On the other hand, the node may also discard the message with probability
1 − α′(), which is described in rule rec2. Rule rec3 expresses that a node
discards a message with probability 1 if the message contents do not match
with the expected message, i.e. the ﬁrst message components do not match
or the message does not have the right length.
Deﬁnitions A:,ασ get simply expanded as shown in rule def. Rules par1 and
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nil 0:,ασ
m:
−→1 0:,ασ
send1
m = 〈E˜〉[E],α
〈E˜〉[E] !P:,ασ
m!
−→1 P :,ασ
send2 〈E˜〉[E] !P:,ασ
m:
−→1 〈E˜〉[E] !P:
,α
σ
rec1
m = 〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′,α′ E˜ = E˜ ′1 |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|
(E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :,ασ
m?
−→α′() P [E˜
′
2/x˜, 
′′/x]:,ασ
rec2
m = 〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′,α′ E˜ = E˜ ′1 |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|
(E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :,ασ
m:
−→1−α′() (E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :
,α
σ
rec3
m = 〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′,α′ E˜ = E˜ ′1 ∨ |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|
(E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :,ασ
m:
−→1 (E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :,ασ
def
A
def
= P P :,ασ
m
−→q P
′:,ασ
A:,ασ
m
−→q P ′:,ασ
par1
P1:
,α
σ
m1
−−→q1 P
′
1:
,α
σ P2:
,α
σ
m2
−−→q2 P
′
2:
,α
σ
P1 | P2:,ασ
m(1◦2)
−−−−−→q1·q2 P
′
1 | P
′
2:
,α
σ
1 ◦ 2 =⊥
parr
N1
m1
−−→q1 N
′
1 N2
m2
−−→q2 N
′
2
N1 ‖ N2
m(1◦2)
−−−−−→q1·q2 N
′
1 ‖ N
′
2
1 ◦ 2 =⊥
◦ ! ? :
! ⊥ ! !
? ! ? ?
: ! ? :
Table 2
Operational Semantics 1
parrfor parallel composition of networks describe how a broadcast message
is propagated to all processes. They use the algebra for the composition
of 1, 2 ∈ {!, ?, :} which is shown in Table 2. Like in original CBS, these
rules makes sure that every node in the network decides about receiving or
discarding a certain message, and also that it is not attempted to broadcast
two messages at the same time, because 1 ◦ 2 =⊥. The probability for the
transition is q1 · q2 when the components’ transitions have probabilities q1 and
q2.
We display rules for the second transition relation −→ in Table 3. The rule
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store
E ∈ E˜ ′ σ′ = σ ∪ 〈E˜〉[E]
〈E˜〉[E]E˜ ′ ↓ P :,ασ −→ P :
,α
σ′
ret1
〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′] ∈ σ E˜ = E˜ ′1 |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|
(E˜; x˜) ↑ P1 : P2:,ασ −→ P1[E˜
′
2/x˜]:
,α
σ
ret2
〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′] ∈ σ. E˜ = E˜ ′1 ∧ |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|
(E˜; x˜) ↑ P1 : P2:,ασ −→ P2:
,α
σ
if1
E = E ′
if E = E ′ then P1 else P2:
,α
σ −→ P1:
,α
σ
if2
E = E ′
if E = E ′ then P1 else P2:
,α
σ −→ P2:
,α
σ
par2
P1:
,α
σ −→ P
′
1:
,α
σ1
P2:
,α
σ −→ P
′
2:
,α
σ2
P1 | P2:,ασ −→ P
′
1 | P
′
2:
,α
σ1∪σ2
Table 3
Operational Semantics 2
store adds a tuple 〈E˜〉 to the its local store σ if the initiator E is found in the
list of authorised initiators E˜′, written E ∈ E˜ ′.
Two rules for retrieval (E˜; x˜) ↑ P1 : P2:,ασ distinguish between the cases
where a certain tuple is or is not contained in the local store. In rule ret1,
if the ﬁrst components of a tuple match and the tuple has the right length,
the remaining tuple components E˜ ′2 get bound to x˜ in the ﬁrst process P1.
Note in particular that in the case of two or more matching tuples, there will
be a nondeterministic choice for the selected tuple; in a concrete application,
determinism might be achieved by the choice of E˜ ′1. Rule ret2 states that if
no matching tuple is found, process P2 will continue.
The two rules for if-expressions if E = E′ then P1 else P2 :
,α
σ choose P1
or P2 as continuing process, depending on the term equality E = E
′. If-
expressions are included for clarity although they might be modelled with the
retrieval statement. Finally, the semantics for parallel composition P1 | P2 is
straightforward. The transition relation is meant to be reﬂexive, i.e. P −→ P ,
such that changes in only one branch are possible.
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3 Security Analysis
The goal of the analysis is to safely approximate violations of the store au-
thorisation property of the annotated calculus in the presence of an attacker
who may eavesdrop on and forge any message. It is represented by a ﬂow
logic, an approach to control ﬂow analysis which focuses on specifying rather
than computing the analysis result. Our implementation is then given by a
transformation of the ﬂow logic’s rules into terms of a fragment of ﬁrst order
logic, which can then be solved using the Succinct Solver [7].
3.1 Store Authorisation
Rule store in Table 3 states that a derivation in the calculus gets stuck for
a node 〈E˜〉[E]E˜ ′ ↓ P :,ασ if E /∈ E˜
′. Recall that E evaluates to a location
′ which represents the initiator of the chain of cause and eﬀect which led to
the storage operation, e.g. another node which had sent an update on some
routing information. Furthermore, E˜ ′ evaluates to a list of locations L˜′ which
specify the locations authorised to trigger the storage operation. The store
authorisation property says, expressed in the terms of our calculus, that “an
initiator ′ of a storage operation 〈E˜〉[′]L˜′ ↓ P must be speciﬁed in the list
L˜′ of authorised nodes for this operation”.
The signiﬁcance of this security property can be seen as follows: Commu-
nication protocols for multi-hop routing, peer-to-peer overlay networks, and
other similar applications require individual nodes to store data with protocol-
related information. As long as all nodes follow the protocol speciﬁcation, the
distributed data is consistent or may contain a tolerable amount of incon-
sistencies due to malfunctioning nodes. However, a problem arises as soon
as a malicious node enters the network and changes the distributed protocol
information at will. Depending on the intentions of the attacker, the work-
ing of the protocol can be seriously constrained, for example by a denial of
service of parts of the network. As an example, we will present a resource
consumption attack on ad-hoc networks in Section 4.2 and show how the list
L˜′ of authorised nodes can be speciﬁed in a straightforward way to express
the requirements in this situation.
3.2 Control Flow Analysis
Our analysis is speciﬁed by a judgement ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :σ, making use of certain
types of analysis components deﬁned below. Here, ρ is the collection of all
local variable environments, σˆ the collection of all local store environments,
V denotes the set of variable-free terms, and the star ∗ represents the type of
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ﬁnite lists. In order to focus on the origin annotations, we do not describe the
analysis of the allocation environments here and refer to [6] for this point.
ρ : X → ℘(V × L) local variable environment
ρ¯ : X → ℘(L) local annotation variable environment
κˆ ⊆ V∗ ×L× L network environment
σˆ ⊆ V∗ ×L local store environment
ε ⊆ L×L× L∗ × V∗ error component
The types of the components reveal the key idea of the origin analysis: val-
ues V ∈ V are paired with locations  ∈ L in order to express that  originated
V . For example, if a node (E; x˜)[x] ?P :,ασ receives a message 〈E˜
′
1, E˜
′
2〉[
′]
′′
, i.e.
originated from ′, the analysis will compute for the variable environment ρ of
 that (Vi, 
′) ∈ ρ(xi) for all estimates Vi of components Ei ∈ E˜ ′2 and respect-
ive xi ∈ x˜. Furthermore, as the message is transmitted on the network, it will
also compute 〈V˜ ′1 , V˜
′
2〉[
′]
′′
∈ κˆ, i.e. the estimated message contents, origin-
ator ′, and immediate sender ′′ will be recorded in the network environment
κˆ. Likewise, the store environment σˆ for  contains storage tuples and their
originators. The annotation variable environment ρ¯ records assignments to
annotation variables, i.e. originator locations.
The error component records violations of the store authorisation property.
If a node attempts a store 〈E˜〉[′]E˜ ′ ↓ P :,ασ and 
′ /∈ L˜′ for estimates L˜′ of E˜ ′,
the analysis will make sure that (′, , L˜′, V˜ ) ∈ ε, i.e. ′, maybe masquerading
as one of the authorised nodes with locations L˜′, tried to insert the tuple 〈V˜ 〉
in the local store of .
3.2.1 Deﬁnition
The actual analysis is deﬁned in Tables 4–6. Table 4 contains the deﬁnition
of two auxiliary judgements for terms. ρ  E : ϑ computes a safe estimation
ϑ ⊆ V × L which contains pairs (V, ′), where V is a value E can evaluate
to and ′ is the originator of this value. In the case for constants terms, i.e.
names and locations, every location is assumed to be originator. For a variable
x, the estimate ϑ includes variable bindings and originators recorded in ρ(x).
For the estimation of the annotations a second judgement ρ¯  E : ϑ¯ is
needed which gives an estimation ϑ¯ ⊆ L of originator locations.
Note for Table 5 and 6 that (E˜, ) ∈ ϑ˜ and similar mean (E1, ) ∈ ϑ1 ∧
· · · ∧ (Ek, ) ∈ ϑk, assuming E˜ represents E1, . . . , Ek for some k. Rules ﬂnil
and ﬂparr are straightforward. Rule ﬂsend says that the network environment
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ﬂvar
ρ(x) ⊆ ϑ
ρ  x : ϑ
ﬂname
∀ ′ ∈ L. (n, ′) ∈ ϑ
ρ  n : ϑ
ﬂloc
∀ ′ ∈ L. (′′, ′) ∈ ϑ
ρ  
′′ : ϑ
ﬂavar
ρ¯(x) ⊆ ϑ¯
ρ¯  x : ϑ¯
ﬂaloc
′′ ∈ ϑ¯
ρ¯  
′′ : ϑ¯
Table 4
Analysis of Terms
ﬂnil
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  0:σ
ﬂsend
ρ¯  E : ϑ¯
ρ  E˜ : ϑ˜
∀ V˜ ′. ∀ ′ ∈ ϑ¯. (V˜ ′, ′) ∈ ϑ˜ ⇒ 〈V˜ ′〉[′] ∈ κˆ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :σ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  〈E˜〉[E] !P:σ
ﬂrec
ρ  E˜ : ϑ˜
∀ 〈V˜ ′1 , V˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′
∈ κˆ. (V˜ ′1 , 
′′) ∈ ϑ˜ ∧  = ′ ⇒
(V˜ ′2 , 
′′) ∈ ρ(x˜) ∧ ′′ ∈ ρ¯(x)
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :σ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  (E˜; x˜)[x] ?P :σ
ﬂparr
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N1 ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N2
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N1 ‖ N2
Table 5
Analysis of Processes 1
κˆ is updated with all possible messages and their respective originator and
immediate sender, 〈V˜ ′〉[′] ∈ κˆ. The condition (V˜ ′, ′) ∈ ϑ˜ makes sure that
′-originated terms V˜ ′ are drawn from the sets of current estimates ϑ˜ for E˜.
′ itself is an element of the estimate ϑ¯ for the annotation term E.
Rule ﬂrec on the other hand looks at all messages 〈V˜ ′1 , V˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′
recorded in
κˆ. It is checked that (V˜ ′1 , 
′′) ∈ ϑ˜, i.e. the ﬁrst components of a sent message
match with the expectation E˜, which is estimated in ϑ˜. Furthermore,  = ′
means that the sending node does not receive messages sent by itself. If these
conditions are fulﬁlled, the variable environments for x˜ and x are updated.
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ﬂstore
ρ¯  E : ϑ¯
ρ  E˜ : ϑ˜
ρ  E˜
′ : ϑ˜′
∀ V˜ . ∀ ′ ∈ ϑ¯. (V˜ , ′) ∈ ϑ˜ ⇒ 〈V˜ 〉[′] ∈ σˆ∧
(′ /∈ ϑ˜′ ⇒ ∀ L˜′ ∈ ϑ˜′. (′, , L˜′, V˜ ) ∈ ε)
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :
σ∪〈V˜ 〉[′]
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  〈E˜〉[E]E˜ ′ ↓ P :σ
ﬂret
ρ  E˜ : ϑ˜
∀ 〈V˜ ′1 , V˜
′
2〉[
′′] ∈ σˆ. (V˜ ′1 , 
′′) ∈ ϑ˜ ⇒
(V˜ ′2 , 
′′) ∈ ρ¯(x˜) ∧ ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P1:

σ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P2:

σ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  (E˜; x˜) ↑ P1 : P2:σ
ﬂif
ρ  E : ϑ
ρ  E
′ : ϑ′
ϑ ∩ ϑ′ = ∅ ⇒ ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P1:σ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P2:

σ
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  if E = E′ then P1 else P2:

σ
ﬂpar
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P1:

σ1
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P2:

σ2
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P1 | P2:

σ1∪σ2
Table 6
Analysis of Processes 2
In Table 6, rule ﬂpar is straightforward. Rule ﬂstore is similar to ﬂsend:
instead of inserting a message into the network environment, now a storage
tuple is inserted into the local store σˆ of the node, 〈V˜ 〉[′] ∈ σˆ. Furthermore,
if the originator ′ is not element of the estimates ϑ˜′ for the annotation list,
the error component ε is updated.
On the other hand, rule ﬂret resembles rule ﬂrec. Clearly, tuples are now
taken from the local store instead of the network environment. For the sake
of precision, continuation branch P1 is only analysed in those cases where
storage retrieval could indeed succeed while P2 is always analysed. This applies
analogously to the equality test in rule ﬂif, which is otherwise straightforward.
3.2.2 Correctness
The subject reduction result in Theorem 3.2 states the semantic correctness
of the ﬂow logic with respect to the operational semantics in Section 2.2. We
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need a substitution lemma ﬁrst.
Lemma 3.1 (Substitution) If FV (E ′) = ∅, the following statements hold:
(1) ρ  E : ϑ and (E
′, ′) ∈ ρ(x) imply ρ  E[E ′/x] : ϑ.
(2) ρ¯  E : ϑ¯ and E
′ ∈ ρ¯(x) imply ρ¯  E[E
′/x] : ϑ¯.
(3) ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :σ and (E
′, ′) ∈ ρ(x) imply ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P [E′/x]:σ.
(4) ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :σ and E
′ ∈ ρ¯(x) imply ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P [E′/x]:σ.
Proof By straightforward structural induction. 
In the proof of Theorem 3.2 we have to make sure to consider only valid
derivations N1
m
−→ N2 in the sense that messages m used as labels have indeed
been sent. This can be formalised by instrumenting the message transition
relation with a message environment κ and thus deriving a new inference
system κ  N1
m
−→ N2 as follows: Messages m are inserted into κ only in
the reception branch of rule parr for the case “1 ◦ 2 = !”; and, each of the
rules κ  N1
m
−→ N2 with 
 ∈ {?, :} gets a new premise m ∈ κ. We can then
ensure that a derivation κ  N1
m
−→ N2 in the calculus ﬁts to a judgement
ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N1 by requiring κ ⊆ κˆ.
Theorem 3.2 (Subject Reduction) If κ ⊆ κˆ and ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N1 and κ 
N1
m
−→ N2, then ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N2. Furthermore, if σ ⊆ σˆ and ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P1:

σ
and P1:

σ−→ P2:

σ′, then ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P2:

σ′.
Proof By induction on the inference rules of κ  N1
m
−→ N2 and N1 −→ N2.
Consider the case of rule rec1: We have from rule rec1 that
(i) m = 〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′
∈ κ
(ii) E˜ = E˜ ′1 ∧ |E˜
′
2| = |x˜|
and furthermore from rule ﬂrec
(iii) ρ  E˜ : ϑ˜
(iv) ∀ 〈V˜ ′1 , V˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′
∈ κˆ. (V˜ ′1 , 
′′) ∈ ϑ˜ ∧  = ′ ⇒ (V˜ ′2 , 
′′) ∈ ρ(x˜) ∧ 
′′ ∈ ρ¯(x)
(v) ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P :σ
Using κ ⊆ κˆ, we know 〈E˜ ′1, E˜
′
2〉[
′′]
′
∈ κˆ with (i). From (ii), (iii), and rules
ﬂname and ﬂloc, we have ∀ ′′ ∈ L. (E˜′1, 
′′) ∈ ϑ˜ since E˜ ′1 is part of a sent
message and therefore variable-free. It is clear from the calculus that  = ′,
as a node cannot receive its own message. Therefore, we have (E˜ ′2, 
′′) ∈
ρ(x˜)∧ ′′ ∈ ρ¯(x) with rule (iv). By applying substitution lemma 3.1 (4) once
and 3.1 (3) |E˜ ′2| times to (v) gives the desired result ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  P [E˜
′
2/x˜, 
′′/x]:σ.
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Rules ret1 and if1 can be proved similarly, whilst the remaining rules are
directly proved by assumption or application of the corresponding ﬂow logic
rule and induction hypothesis. 
The following theorem shows that the derivation in the calculus cannot be
stuck because of violations of the store authorisation property if our analysis
does not report an error in ε. To establish this, let N1
unsafe
−−−→ N2 be a derivation
with the condition E ∈ E˜ ′ of rule store eliminated.
Theorem 3.3 If N1
unsafe
−−−→ N2 and ρ, κˆ, σˆ, ε  N1 with ε = ∅, then N1 −→ N2.
Proof We only have to regard rule store as the two inference systems are
otherwise the same. From rule store in the unsafe semantics, we have σ′ =
σ ∪ 〈E˜〉[E]. As E˜ and E are thus components of a storage tuple, we have
FV (E˜) = ∅ and FV (E) = ∅. Therefore, it follows with ρ¯  E : ϑ¯ and
ρ  E˜ : ϑ˜ from rule ﬂstore that (E˜, E) ∈ ϑ˜. Thus, the statement E /∈ ϑ˜′ ⇒
∀ L˜′ ∈ ϑ˜′. (E, , L˜′, E˜) ∈ ε holds. Because ε = ∅ but ϑ˜′ = ∅ it follows E ∈ ϑ˜′.
Thus E ∈ E˜ ′ and the conditions for rule store in the standard semantics are
fulﬁlled. 
3.3 Attacker Model
The attacker A is simply speciﬁed as the following term of our process calculus,
where A ∈ ℘(N) is the set of arities occurring for a certain network to be
analysed and x˜k denotes a k-element list of variables:
A = (|k∈A(; x˜k)[x] ?A | 〈x˜k〉[A] !A) :
A,αA
σA
This means that A may receive any message with any number of compon-
ents and acquire some knowledge in this way. This is then expressed in the
analysis by the variable environment ρA increasing with variable bindings for
all messages recorded in κˆ. On the other hand, A may also forge messages of
arities which have already been used in the network. For these messages, the
analysis keeps track of A as originator as the sending is annotated with A.
This follows the idea of a classical Dolev-Yao attacker, but with the dif-
ference that no cryptography is involved. This is appropriate as the AODV
protocol we are modelling in Section 4 does not use cryptographic primitives.
We plan to look at secure versions of protocols in future work, where then
cryptographic primitives could be added to the calculus like in [1].
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4 Analysis of the AODV Protocol
In an ad-hoc network, a group of wireless nodes cooperates with each other
in order to forward messages to destinations beyond the direct transmission
range of a sender. The Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing
protocol [8] is a protocol for this setting in which a node tries to ﬁnd a route to
a destination only if needed (on-demand). It furthermore requires that each
node stores a “vector” of direction (the next hop) and distance (number of
hops) for a particular destination. In the following we describe the operation
of AODV and show how to model it in our calculus. We then perform the
analysis of Section 3 in order to detect violations of the store authorisation
property in presence of an attacker.
4.1 Operation and Modelling of the AODV Protocol
If a node S (source) needs to communicate with another node D (destination)
for which it has no routing information, S initiates a route discovery process.
Because of the complexity of the protocol, we will describe and model this
process in a simpliﬁed version by leaving out expiration time and freshness
information for routes (sequence numbers) as well as distance information.
Furthermore, we deﬁne αi() := 1 for all  ∈ L and allocation environments
αi, i.e. every node can see every other node and the connection graph is the
complete graph on L. In Section 4.2 we will discuss the implications of these
assumptions on our security analysis in detail.
A route discovery comprises the following steps:
(1) S initiates the route discovery by broadcasting a route request rreq which
contains the source, the destination, and the name of the forwarding node of
the request. This is a 4-tuple 〈rreq, S,D,N ′〉, with N ′ as the immediate
sender, thus N ′ = S in the case for S.
(2) Every node N receiving a rreq checks whether it is the destination itself,
i.e. N = D.
If not, N will store a vector for the reverse route in order to be able to
propagate a reply from D back to S. In case N received the rreq from
an immediate sender N ′, it will thus store the tuple 〈rev, S,N ′〉. Then it
rebroadcasts the request as 〈rreq, S,D,N〉, replacing the name of the imme-
diate sender N ′ with its own name.
If N = D, the node will answer with a route reply rrep, which contains
its name (the destination), the source, the name of the forwarding node of the
reply, and the next hop (the addressee). In case D received the rreq from
an immediate sender N ′, it will thus send the 5-tuple 〈rrep, D, S,D,N ′〉.
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P
(1)
i = |
n
j=1,i =j 〈rreq, i, j, i〉[i] !Ni
P
(2)
i = (rreq; xsrc, xdst, xsend)[xorig] ?
if i = xdst then
〈rrep, xdst, xsrc, i, xsend〉[i] !Ni
else
〈rev, xsrc, xsend〉[xorig]xsrc ↓
〈rreq, xsrc, xdst, i〉[xorig] !Ni
P
(3)
i = (rrep; xdst, xsrc, xsend, xaddr)[xorig] ?
if i = xaddr then
(rev, xsrc; x
′
send) ↑
(〈forw, xdst, xsend〉[xorig]xdst ↓
if i = xsrc then Ni
else 〈rrep, xdst, xsrc, i, x
′
send〉[xorig] !Ni) : Ni
else Ni
Pi = P
(1)
i | P
(2)
i | P
(3)
i
Nn = ‖ni=1 Pi:
i,αi
σi
Table 7
The AODV Protocol
(3) Every node N receiving 〈rrep, D, S,N ′, N ′′〉 checks whether it is the ad-
dressee, i.e. N = N ′′. This implements a unicast on top of the broadcast,
as all nodes will just drop the message if they are not addressed. Otherwise,
N will try to retrieve the reverse route for S as a tuple 〈rev, S,N ′′′〉. If suc-
cessful, it will store a forward route forw in order to be able to propagate
further messages from S to D. It will thus store a tuple 〈forw, D,N ′〉. If
N = S it could now start sending data. Otherwise it rebroadcasts the reply
as 〈rrep, D, S,N,N ′′′〉.
The modelling of the protocol, shown in Table 7, follows exactly this de-
scription. It represents a network of n nodes in which nodes are distinguished
by locations 1, . . . , n to replace the names S,D,N, . . . of the informal de-
scription. Every node i tries to initiate a route request to all other nodes j
with i = j. As a surplus we have of course the annotations for the origin of
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messages. For example, in P
(1)
i the rreq is labelled [i] to denote the respect-
ive source i as the originator of this message. The same applies in P
(2)
i in
the rrep for the respective destination. Otherwise, on reception of a message
in either P
(2)
i or P
(3)
i , the originator is bound to xorig. When only forwarding
messages, as for example with the statement 〈rreq, xsrc, xdst, i〉[xorig] !Ni,
the originator remains.
4.2 Analysis Results
For some n ∈ N, we analyse the network Nn of Table 7. In a scenario without
attacker, all nodes behave according to the speciﬁcation. For i, j, k,m ∈
{1, . . . , n}, our analysis puts exactly the following messages in the network
environment:
∀ i. ∀ j, j = i. ∀ k, k = j. 〈rreq, i, j, k〉[i]k ∈ κˆ
∀ j. ∀ i, i = j. ∀ k, k = i. ∀ m,m = k. 〈rrep, j , i, k, m〉[j]k ∈ κˆ
This conﬁrms that the analysis is very precise and in particular suitable
for the origin analysis: rreqs with i as source do only have i as originator,
and analogously for rreps with j. The immediate sender k is in both cases
always diﬀerent from the ﬁnal receiving node and – in the case of a rrep –
also diﬀerent from the addressee m, which shows the precision of the analysis
in this example.
We have a similar precision for the computation of the stores σˆi .
∀ j. ∀ i, i = j. ∀ k, k = j. 〈rev, i, k〉[i]k ∈ σˆj
∀ i. ∀ j, j = i. ∀ k, k = i. 〈forw, j, k〉[j]k ∈ σˆi
For the reverse path rev, which is set up to propagate a possible route
reply back to the source i, we have that all stores σˆj with i = j contain
tuples which have been originated by i and have a next hop k diﬀerent from
j. Analogously, this holds for the forward path forw with the roles of i and
j switched.
From this, it is clear that our analysis correctly computes the error com-
ponent ε as the empty set. This changes as soon as the attacker A, speciﬁed in
Section 3.3, is added to the analysis. For a concrete example of the attacker’s
impact, consider the network N4 with four nodes. In ε, the analysis will insert
tuples of the form (A, , 
′, E˜) where A (ﬁxed) is the location of the attacker
who masquerades as ′ and thus would succeed in inserting the tuple E˜ into σˆ.
We consider the case where the attacker is masquerading as 4, i.e. 
′ = 4,
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and look at the forw-cases with  = 1, 2, 3. For the sake of clarity, we
will show in Table 8 the tuple (E˜) instead of the full tuple (A, , 4, E˜), and
indicate in the top row, at which location  this tuple is inserted.
1 2 3
1 (forw, 4, 1) (forw, 4, 2) (forw, 4, 3)
2 (forw, 4, 2) (forw, 4, 3) (forw, 4, 1)
3 (forw, 4, 3) (forw, 4, 1) (forw, 4, 2)
4 (forw, 4, 4) (forw, 4, 4) (forw, 4, 4)
Table 8
Store tuples inserted by the attacker
Table 8 shows the following: As the attacker A may forge any message using
names and locations occurring in communications he was able to eavesdrop
on, A can succeed in inserting arbitrary tuples at all locations. Thus every
possible next hop 1, . . . , 4 shows as the third component of each storage tuple.
It is important to note that none of these values is actually a false positive:
Tuples in the error component exactly represent violations of the property,
and any of these tuples might aﬀect the proper working of the protocol.
However, not any inserted tuple will have the same eﬀect and usually a
successful attacker needs some strategy. If for example A inserts the respective
tuples from line 1 of Table 8 at locations i (for i = 1, 2, 3), the “next hop” for
destination 4 would be speciﬁed as i itself: It is likely that this inconsistency
will be detected by the respective node by consistency checks not included in
our modelling. A similar argument applies if A chooses to insert the tuples
of line 4: Nodes would just try to forward messages to node 4 which they
expect to be in their neighbourhood. If 4 is indeed in the neighbourhood, the
functioning of the protocol is not restrained. Otherwise, the nodes would just
assume that 4 moved out of their transmission range and start a route repair
process.
On the other hand, choosing line 2 or 3 will prove to be a powerful attack
on the network: In both cases, the forwarding links form a loop, for example
in line 2, 1 will forward to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 1. Thus, if A drops a message
for 4 in the system, it will be forwarded as long as the power resources of
the nodes last or a node leaves the network for other reasons. This resource
consumption attack is known as a routing loop [5].
However, deﬁnite conclusions about the security of the AODV protocol re-
quire a look at our assumptions from Section 4. The omission of the expiration
time information seems valid as it concerns only reverse routes. Similarly, the
S. Nanz, C. Hankin / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 195–213 211
attacker may choose distance information at will and as such always advertise
routes requiring less hops which thus are accepted by the honest nodes. In
contrast, sequence numbers are a key fact used in the proof of the loop-free
property of the AODV protocol in [8] and it seems problematic to omit them
in our model. We can however refer to [4] where an attack is described which
sets a sequence number of a node to any desired value.
Our last assumption concerned the topology of the network. Our frame-
work can express ﬁne-grained topology information, as shown in [6], but in
our model we chose to consider the fully connected graph only. This decision
arises from the following observation: If we speciﬁed a particular topology for
a scenario of n nodes, results would be restricted to this choice. If we then
derive that a certain attack is not possible in the network, the same attack
might still be possible for another topology. By taking the complete graph, we
perform a safe analysis in the sense that the attacker will monitor the max-
imum of possibly sent messages in the network and gain maximal knowledge
for an attack.
It is not possible though to draw the conclusion that an attacker A may
introduce a routing loop into any network with more than four nodes. Quite
the contrary, A will have to use knowledge about the network topology in
order to insert diﬀerent tuples at diﬀerent locations: it might for example
be necessary to move closer to particular nodes and to prevent others from
hearing a certain communication. For other topologies, the attack might be
simply impossible, e.g. if feasible physical connections never form a loop.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a broadcast process calculus with local storage operations
which proved to be expressive enough to model the core of a distance vector
protocol for ad-hoc networks. The calculus is extended with annotations which
allow to verify the compliance of participating nodes with the property that
only certain authorised nodes may force other nodes to store speciﬁc data. We
have developed a static analysis which can detect violations of this property.
As to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst application of formal automated methods
for security analysis in the setting of ad-hoc networks.
The application of the analysis to our protocol model showed that a simple
attacker who records all network communication and forges arbitrary messages
using this knowledge, may introduce a routing loop in some networks. The
analysis is safe in the sense that it produces all possible attacks. However,
some of these attacks might be not applicable if a certain network topology
is given, a fact that is not deduced by the analysis. The interpretation of the
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analysis results needed thus careful consideration of our assumptions.
By extending routing messages with cryptographic features such as signa-
tures or hash chains, the development of secure versions of routing protocols
is under way, e.g. in [5]. It thus suggests itself that future work should include
an extension of the calculus to cryptographic primitives in order to put the
security of these protocols to the test and maybe reveal unknown ﬂaws.
Furthermore, the discussion of the analysis results has shown that the
inﬂuence of topology considerations on security questions needs more invest-
igation. Our calculus provides a basis for this, as it allows the consideration
of arbitrary topologies. In most applications, the choice of a speciﬁc topology
will be too simple. But it might be advantageous to consider certain classes
of topologies by just assuming allocation environments to be deﬁned accord-
ing to appropriate constraints. When allowing for changes of the allocation
environments over time, even node mobility could be expressed.
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